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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEGREGATION OF BAWDY HouSES AS PoucE REGULATIoN.-The city of Dallas by ordinance prohibited the keeping of bawdy
houses except in a certain defined district or reservation. The constitutionality of the ordinance was attacked on the ground that the value of the
estates adjacent to the reservation would be depreciated without adequate
compensation to the owners, and property of such owners thereby taken
without due process of law. Held, since the city charter expressly gave
the municipal authorities power to regulate and control houses of prostitution, the manner of exercising such delegated police power is a matter
of legislative discretion not subject to review by the judiciary. Incidental
pecuniary injury to private porperty does not warrant the overthrow of
legislation of a police character. Hatcher v. City of Dallas, 133 S. W. 914
(Tex. i91).
A municipality has power to deal with the question of prostitution by
ordinance, only when such power is expressly delegated to it by the state,
since the inforcement of such an ordinance involves the punishment of acts
'vhich constitute offenses against the penal statutes of the state. Moran v.
City of Atlanta, IO2 Ga. 84 (1898). For the same reason the city authorities
never have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings against the keepers of bawdy
houses. State v. Wister, 62 Mo. 592 (1876). Such delegated power must
be exercised in a manner not conflicting with the constitution or laws of the
state. Cruel and unusual punishment may not be inflicted. In. re Ah You, 88
Cal. 99 (189i). A house of ill-fame may not be destroyed as a nuisance
Bristol, etc., Co. v. City of Bristol, 97 Va. 3o4 (1899). Houses of prostitution may not be taxed and licensed as such. City of San Antonio v.
Schneider, 37 S. W. 767 (Tex. i896).
An ordinance which covers exactly the same ground as a criminal statute
is void because it attempts to expose the infringer thereof to two prosecutions for the same act. The city ordinance must be directed to something
other than the simple keeping of houses of ill fame, as, for instance, to the
manner of keeping them, or the place in which they are kept. State v.
Oleson, 26 Minn. 507 (i88o). The municipality may compel the segregation
of bawdy houses within a reservation and regulate the manner in which they
may be conducted there, but the penal laws of the state are not thereby
suspended in the district. McDonald v. Denton, 132 S. W. 823 (Tex. 191o).
The principal case is supported by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 587 (igoo), which holds that the
segregation of prostitutes is a valid exercise of the police power, justified
by public necessity and welfare, and that the particular members of the
public who suffer damage to their propery for the benefit of the many cannot be heard in court.

CONTRACTS-BUILDING-NECESSITY OF ARCHITECT'S CERTIFICATE.-By the
terms of a contract, a subcontractor was to construct certain tubs in a
brewery in course of erection "under the direction and to the satisfaction of
a construction Eompany" designated as architect, and all payments were to
be made "upon written certificate of the architect." After the tubs had been
completed and put into use, the subcontractor requested a certificate but was
refused. He filed a mechanic's lien and brought suit. Held, in this case
the party giving the certificate was a party to the contract sued upon, and
therefore the subcontractor could recover on proving that the certificate was
withheld in bad faith. Had the architect been a third party, fraudulent
collusion between him and the owner must have been established. Thaler
(6)
Bros. v. Greisser Construction Co., 229 Pa. 512 (1911).

RECENT CASES
Although no jurisdiction goes to the extreme of holding, in suits upon
contracts requiring the satisfaction of a third person designated as architect,
that the production of the architect's certificate is an absolute pre-requisite to
the right of recovery by the contractor, the courts differ greatly in the rules
which excuse failure to produce it. The English cases lay down the rule
that the certificate may be dispensed with only where there has been a prevention of its procurement by the employer, whether by collusion with the
architect or otherwise. Mere fraud on the part of the architect will not
excuse its non-production. Smith v. Howden Union 25 Q. B. D. 151 (890).
In the United States there is a tendency to extend the occasions for dispensing with the certificate. In the Federal Courts, a substantial performance
of the contract, and a refusal of the certificate after demand, will sustain a
recovery without 'it. Bush v. Jones, i44 Fed. 942 (igo6). The New York
courts follow the same rule. Thomas v. Stewart, 132 N. Y. 580 (1892). In
Wisconsin and New Jersey, a mistake of judgment on part of the architect
will not help the contractor. He must prove positive bad faith in the architect. Wendt v. Vogel, 87 Wis. 422 (i894) ; Sheyer v. Pinkerton Const. Co.,
59 Atl. 462 (N. J. I9O4). In Tennessee, the refusal of the architect to give
the certificate must be proved to have been malicious, unreasonable and fraudulent. P. & M. J. Bannon v. Jackson, 12i Tenn. 381 (I9o8). The Pennsylvania courts adhere to the strict rule and hold that nothing short of fraudulent collusion between the architect and the owner will excuse the nonproduction of the certificate where the contract requires it. Payne v. Roberts,
214 Pa. 568 (19o6) ; Fay v. Lester Piano Co., 39 Pa. Super. 88 (igog). Partiality, fraud or mistaken judgment on the part of the architect will not
avail the contractor: McNally v. Montour R. R. Co., 33 Pa. Super. 44 (19o7).
CONTRAcT-RsTRAINT OF TRADE.-Two dealers in junk, who control from
90 to 95 per cent. of the Canadian junk business between the Great Lakes

and the Rocky Mountains, agreed to maintain a fixed schedule of prices to
be paid for junk, and stipulated for a division of profits. In a suit by one
dealer against the other, it was held that the agreement was not void at common law as being in restraint of trade. Shragge v. Weidman, i5 Western
Canada L. R. 616 (i9io).
In the course of his opinion one of the judges of the Court of Appeals
said, "The tendency of judicial decisions has been to narrow the application of the rule that once forbade all contracts in restraint of trade, and to
recognize the validity of such contracts when their provisions are such
only as are reasonably necessary for the protection of the parties." Reasoning from this statement of the law, the court concluded that the parties
involved in the case had entered into the agreement for their own protection only, and that their contract was, therefore, valid.
The tendency of the English law, as expressed above, has come to control American judicial opinion in most jurisdictions, provided the restrictions of the contract are not so large as to affect the public interest. Park
and Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, i75 N. Y. 1 (1903);
Merriam v. Drayton & Leonard, 104 Va. 428 (i9o5). But it is doubtful
whether a contract to control prices at which goods are to be sold, within as
large a district as the agreement in the principal case included, would be
enforceable in the United States. In Charleston Gas Co. v. Kanawha Co..
58 W. Va. 22 (905), two corporations supplying a community with natural
gas agreed to parcel out the territory, fix prices and cease competing. The
contract was held void. And an agreement between 6o of the 75 mason contractors in a city, fixing a scale of prices, was declared unenforceable in
Milwaukee Masons and Builders' Ass'n v. Niezerowski, 95 Wis. 129 (1897).
Indeed, some of the state courts still take the position that any combination
between dealers to control prices is unlawful as against public policy. Hunt
v. Riverside Co-operative Club, 140 Mich. 538 (I9O5).
Whether is makes any material difference that an agreement concerns
the price at which goods are to be bought, instead of the selling price, has
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not been brought out in the cases. Shragge v. Weidman, supra, reaches the
conclusion that there is a difference, since the possibility of stifling competition by means of regulating buying prices, is much less than the ability
to control the market by fixing selling prices. It is doubtful whether this
distinction can be well taken. However, in the case mentioned, the fact
that the commodity which the parties dealt was comparatively insignificant
to the public, may have had some influence in the decision rendered.
In one of the opinions in the principal case, the argument was advanced
that since a partnership to effectuate the purpose of the parties, would undoubtedly have been legal, the agreement in question musf be legal. But it is
submitted that the same argument could be applied to any combination the
purpose of which is to control prices, and carrid to its logical conclusion
it would negative the possibility of declaring a contract void as in restraint
of trade at common law.
COVENANT-RESTRAINT

OF TRADE-In

Allen Mfg. Co. v. Murphy, 22

Ontario L. R. 539 (Igio), the defendant on entering the employ of the
plaintiffs contracted that for three years after leaving the employment he
would not be interested directly or indirectly in any business of a similar
kind within the limits of the Dominion of Canada. The plaintiff's business
was compound, consisting of two branches. The defendant within three
years started a customs laundry, which was one part of the plaintiff's business. The court granted an injunction and account.
The case is in accord with the general trend of English authority. The
rule seems to be that contracts with a vendor of a business, or with a retiring
partner or employee are valid if limited to competing business and a territory reasonably necessary to the protection of the promisee's business.
Chitty, Contracts, 15th Ed. p. 65o. Such contracts are considered not to be
against public policy and the question of the reasonableness of the restraint
is one of law for the court in each case. Dowden v. Pook [19O4] I K. B. 45.
The most interesting point in the case is the decision that where the
plaintiff's business is a compound one the pursuit of one of its components
is the pursuit of a business of a similar kind and that a contract of which
this amounts to a breach is not so broadly in restraint of trade as to be
against public policy. It is interesting to compare this ruling with the case
of Leetham v. Johnstone-White [19071 i Ch. 189, 322, 327 where the employer was engaged in two distinct businesses. The employee on leaving engaged in the one other than that in which he had been employed and it was
held that the employer could not require the employee to enter into covenants restricting him from competing in a business other than the exact kind
in which he had been employed. The two cases are easily distinguishable and
both seem correct.
The case is also of interest in showing over how broad a territory such
a contract may extend and still be reasonable. For this point there is good
authority in the recent English case of Nordenfelt Co. v. Nordenfelt [19o4]
A. C. 535 in which a world wide restriction was held reasonable.
The American law seems to be in accord with the modern English view,
i. e., that the extent of the restriction is to be determined by the extent
reasonably necessary to protect the business. Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 4o6 L. R. A. 255 and cases cited. In that case the territory was larger
than the business required.
CRIMINAL LAw-SUsP2NSION OF SENTENCE BY COURT AT COILMON LAW..-

Defendant was convicted of gaming, and, after sentence had been pronounced,
the court granted a suspension of execution of sentence, merely as an act of
clemency. Held, that such a power is not by the common law vested in the
judiciary.

State v. Mullins, 7o S. E. 6 (S. C. igiI).

At common law a reprieve or suspension of sentence might be granted
by the court either before or after judgment in certain cases where, the
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court having no power to grant new trials, and the punishments after consisting of branding or other physicial infliction, the temporary suspension of
sentence was necessary so that the convict might not suffer the penalty without first having an opportunity to apply for a pardon or other relief afforded
by the law. 4 B1. Com. Ch. 31; 2 Hale P. C. 412. And even at the present
time, it is universally held that the courts have power to suspend sentence so
far as it is necessary for the correction of errors. People v. Barrett, 202 Ill.
287 (19o2)." But the great weight of authority is in support of the principal case in denying an extension of that power, so far as the suspension of
execution of a sentence already pronounced is concerned; to allow the court
such a power would be an infringement on the pardoning power constitutionally
vested in the executive. Miller v. Evans, II Ia. io (I9oi) ; In re Webb,
89 Wis. 354 (1895) ; see note 14 L. R. A. 285; contra, Weber v. State, 58 Ohio
St. 616 (1898).
But a distinction is made between the power to suspend enforcement of
a sentence, and the power to suspend sentence; while the former is very
generally denied, there is a diversity of opinion as to the latter. "It is not
competent for a judicial bfficer to suspend indefinitely the sentence which the
law makes it his duty to impose upon a person duly convicted, or who may
plead guilty in his court. It relieves the offender for the time being from
the punishment which the law has prescribed shall be inflicted. Moreover
the pardoning power is reposed in the governor, and not in the judges.
Champlin, J., in People v. Reilly, 53 Mich. 26o (1884) ; see opinion of Cooley,
J., in People v. Brown, 54 Mich. I5 (1885) ; People v. Barrett, supra; Neal v.
State, 104 Ga. 509 (i898). But this view is repudiated by the New York
courts which draw a clear distinction between the power to pardon and the
power to suspend sentence, which exists both in their origin and in their
nature; the exercise of the former not only exempts the guilty one from
punishment, but also removes all civil disabilities imposed on account of the
crime, whereas the exercise of the latter relieves the guilty one only from
the punishment prescribed. People v. Court of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 288
(1894). And in accord with this view are: Comm. v. Dunleavey, 16 Pa.
Super. 380 (19Oi); Comm. v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133 (1874).
EVIDENcE-RES IPSA LoQuiu.-In
the case of Lanning v. Pittsburg
Railway Co., 229 Pa. 575 (I9II), the plaintiff, a pedestrian in the street, was
injured by a broken trolley wire. No testimony was introduced to show how
the breaking occurred or whether there was any negligence on the part of the
defendant. Held, error to submit the question of defendant's negligence to
the jury on the ground that it could be fairly inferred from all the circumstances and because no other cause was apparent to which the falling of
the wire could be attributed.
This case is directly in line with a long list of authorities in Pennsylvania. Patterson Co. v. Pittsburg Rys. Co., 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 212 (1908);
Kepner v. Traction Co., 183 Pa. 24 (897); Oil Co. v. Torpedo Co., i9o Pa.
350 (1899) ; Steams v. Ontario Spinning Co., 184 Pa. 519 (I898). It is submitted that this denial of the ordinary application of the rule of evidence,
res ipsa loquitur, in Pennsylvania is not only in absolute conflict with adjudged cases in all other jurisdictions, but also altogether wrong in principle.
i In this state the rule res ipsa loquitur is restricted to cases where there
is an absolute duty or an obligation practically amounting to that of an insurer.
For this reason it could not apply in the present case; a street railway is not
an insurer of the safety of pedestrians. The argument used by the court in
the present case was that to apply the rule here would practically make the
company's liability that of an insurer. This is unsound for the presumption
is prima facie only and rebuttable by the defendant. Addison Torts, Sec. 33.
There is no real reason for not putting the onus of disproof on the defendant. The latter is under a duty to use the highway in such a manner that
others lawfully thereon will not be injured. Chandler v. P. R. T., io Del. Co.
(Pa.) 583. It is true that in the absence of negligence on their part the de-
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fendants might not be liable but it is safe to say that in general, portions of
the equipment do not fall to the street unless there has been some lack of
proper precaution. At all events the facts of each case are peculiarly within
the defendant's knowledge. If there has been no negligence it is within their
power to prove it. On the other hand, the injured person is powerless to
show lack of care. He has neither the knowledge nor means of inquiry into
the minute details of the defendant company's operation. A trolley wire
falls. It is impossible in the average case to show why the wire fell. It
is, however, well within the defendant's power to show that the fastenings
were proper, in good condition or recently inspected. In the absence of
such evidence and until it is introduced it is surely a reasonable inference
that the occurrence was due to some fault of the company's. There is therefore, a very practical reason for applying the rule res ipsa loquitur in all
cases of this type.
The only authorities in this state in favor of the position contended for
are two county court decisions. Chandler v. P. R. T., ioDel. Co., 583, and
Zercher v. P. R. T., Legal Int., Jan. 13, i91i.The first of these contains a
well chosen list of cases upon the subject. Outside of Pennsylvania, the
authorities are in accord and by all of them the rule res ipsa loquitur is
applied to similar cases. A few of the many cases that might be cited are:
Byrne v. Boadle (falling barrel), 2 H. & C. (1863) ; Kearney v. Ry. (Brick
fell from bridge), L. R. 6 Q. B. 759 (1871) per Kelly, C. B. "The question
then is whether there was any evidence of negligence on the part of the
defendants. They were under the common law liability to keep the bridge
in repair." Gleeson v. Va. Ry. (landslide on track), 140 U. S.435 (189) ;
Curtis v. Rochester Ry. Co., (bumping cars), i8 N. Y. 23 (1896) ; Sheridan
v. Foley, (falling brick), 58 N. J. L. 23o (895) ; Larson v. Central Ill. Ry.,
(fallen wire), 56 Ill. App. 263 (i894); Houston v. Curtis (defective derrick), 66 Vt. 331 (894) ; Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp, 74 Ohio, 379 (Igo6).
In the last case the facts were exactly similar to those under discussion.
It is to be hoped that some day in the near future the courts in Pennsylvania will break away from a rule that must work injustice in so many
cases. The principle is an important one and of general application. Were
it confined solely to traction company accident cases there might be some
justification in the policy of preventing trumped-up suits, but such is not the
situation and there seems no reason for such an arbitrary exception to authority otherwise unanimous.
EVIDENCE-TELEPHONE

CONVERSATION

BETWEEN

PARTIEs-ADmISSIBILITY.

-The case of Warren Gzowski & Co. v. Forst & Co., 22 Ont. Law Rep. 441
(igio), brought up the question of the admissibility of conversations over
the telephone, apparently a new point in the jurisdiction. The actual conversation being in controversy between the parties, testimony of witnesses
who had overheard the defendant as he spoke into the receiver, was admitted,
though the witnesses could not affirm to whom he spoke or that he was ill
fact speaking to any one. The case was decided entirely on the authority
of some United States cases, chiefly McCarthy v. Peach, 186 Mass. 67 (Io4).
All courts agree in holding that since the telephone has become a recognized mode of intercourse, business communications made in this way are
as binding as if the telegraph or mails were used. Thompson Co. v. Appleby,
5 Kan. App. 679 (897).
Recognizing therefore the general admissibility of
telephone communications as evidence two general questions arise: The
first of these is involved in the principal case and is whether it is competent for a person overhearing one end of the conversation to testify to
it. The cases differ a little on this question. McCarthy v. Peach, supra,
decides that a third person may repeat such a conversation and that it is
for the jury to determine whether'an actual dialogue took place. On the
other hand, Miles v. Andrews, 153 IL. 262 (1894), requires that it be conclusively proved that the conversation took place between the alleged
parties. As there was no doubt the parties actually conversed in the case
under discussion this doubtful point was not decided.
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The other question, upon which there is a wide difference of opinion, is
the degree of identification required. The cases here fall into two classes.
First: Where the conversation does not depend on its being held with a

particular individual but merely with any one having authority to make the
statements required. In general it is held that connection made with the
phone of the office or place of business of the firm or person in question is
prima facie evidence that communication was had with that office and that

it is not necessary an individual voice be recognized to raise a presumption

that the person speaking was an agent of the party. Wolfe v. Missouri P.
R. Co., 97 Mo. 473; Rock Island Ry. v. Potter, 36 11. App. 590; General
Hospital v. Rendering Co., 79 Conn. 58I. Contra: Planters Oil Co. v.
Western Union Co., 55 S. E. 495 (Ga. i9o6). Second: Where the admis-

sibility of a telephonic communication depends upon its having been made
to a particular individual and not merely with a person connected with an

office or place of business. In general the courts hold that there must be satisfactory identification of the person who is sought to be charged by the conversation. Thompson Co. v. Appleby, supra; Murphy v. Jack, 142 N. Y. 215;
App. 632. The Missouri rule seems
Kimbar v. Illinois Car Co., 103 Ill.
contra, holding that connection with the number desired raises a prima facie
presumption of identification. Globe Printing Co. v. Stahl, 23 Mo. App. 451;

Guest v. Hannibal, etc., Ry., 77 Mo. App. 258. Pennsylvania is in line with
the majority. Swing v. Walker, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 366; Dunham v. McMichael, 214 Pa. 485. Recognition of the voice is accepted as a means of
identification, because in many cases no other means are available. Shawyer
v. Chamberlain, 113 Iowa, 742; Gall v. Wolliver, 1O3 Ill App. 71; Wigmore
Evid., Sec. 2155.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-IEFFECT OF APPOINTMENT OF MORTGAGOR
AS EXECUTOR OF MORTGAGEE.-A testatrix, holding a first mortgage upon certain realty, devised all her property, "including notes and mortgages," to a
relative and appointed the mortgagor as her executor. The executor charged
himself with the amount of the mortgage debt in the inventory, and then
assigned the debt and the mortgage to the legatee under the will who proceeded to foreclose the mortgage. The holder of a second mortgage upon the
same propery foreclosed subsequently and brought a suit to be placed in possession, contending that the act of the mortgagor in charging himself as
executor with the amount of the debt as assets, operated as a payment of the
debt and a discharge of the mortgage, so that his second mortgage thereby
gained priority. But it was held that the title of the legatee, gainid by foreclosure of the first mortgage, which was in fact undischarged, was valid as
against the subsequent mortgagee. The equitable rule requiring the debt to
be charged as assets could not be invoked to the detriment of the estate.
Stewart v. Hurd, 78 AtI. 838 (Me. 19i).
By the common law in England, the appointment by a testator of his
debtor as his executor released or extinguished the debt, because the right
to sue for the debt, once suspended through the inability of the executor to sue
himself could not be revived. Needham's Case, 8 Co. 136 a (16o7). But in
equity the debt became assets in the hands of the executor for the payment
of debts and legacies. Berry v. Usher, ii Ves. 88 (18o5); Williams, Executors, p. lO54. The common law rule of extinguishment has had little, if
any, force in the United States. By decisions and by statutes declaratory
of the equitable rule (see Pa. Act of Feb. 24, 1834, Sec. 6, P. L. 73), the debt
is declared to be assets in the hands of the personal representative, and
must be included in the inventory. Eichelberger v. Morris, 6 Watts 42 (Pa.
1837) ; Wachsmuth v. Penn Mutual Ins. Co., 241 Ill. 409 (19o9). The debtor
is liable as executor for failure to accotmt to the proper persons for the
amount of the debt as cash in his hands. Basset v. Granger, 136 Mass. 174
(1883) ; State, ex rel. Moseley v. Johnson, 141 N. C. 257 (1907). Even when
the debtor was insolvent at the time of his appointment, the sureties on his
bond as executor have been held liable for the amount of the debt, con-
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sidered as assets unaccounted for. Basset v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 184
Mass. 210 (19o3) ; Jones v. West, 67 Oh. St. 28 (19o2) ; contra, Lyon v. Osgood, 58 Vt. 707 (1886) ; Sanchez v. Forster, 133 Cal. 614 (go1).
But the rule that a debt due from a personal representative is to be considered as cash assets will never be allowed to operate to the prejudice of
the estate. The representative is chargeable with interest upon the debt until it
is actually paid. Terhune v. Oldis, 44 N. J. Eq. 146 (i888); Rodenbach's
As in the principal case, the rule never has the
Appeal, io2 Pa. 572 (883).
effect of discharging a lien securing the debt. Anderson v. Anderson, 183
Pa. 480 (1897) ; Soverhill v. Suydam, 59 N. Y. i4o (1874).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-IcE AS DEFECT IN SIDEWALK.-,In O'Keefe v.
Edinburgh [191] Session Cases i8, an action was brought for the death
of the plaintiff's wife, due to a fall on ice on the sidewalk of the city. The
ice was formed from an overflow of a public fountain. The negligence alleged was the failure to keep the water in the fountain properly regulated
or failure to put cinders or salt on the ice when it had formed. The court
held that the negligence to support a recovery must come under one of two
heads: First, that there was some structural defect in the fountain which
made overflows probable, or second, that the fountain having for some
temporary or fortuitous cause overflowed, this dislocation of the ordinary arrangements had been brought to the knowledge of the authorities or had
existed for such a length of time that they ought to have known and that
they failed to remedy the temporary defect. Recovery was denied.
The court based its decision on a dictium of Baron Pigott in Shepherd
v. Midland Rwy. Co., 25 L. T. 879 (1872), where he said: "Whether there
was any evidence of a neglect of duty is a question of degree. If there had
*
there may have been no neglibeen only a very small piece of ice *
gence."
Injuries resulting from the presence of ice or snow on sidewalks are
so common that the principles of law in such cases are fairly well settled.
The mere presence of ice is not of itself evidence of any negligence, Drennan v. Kingston, 23 App. Rep. 4o6 (Ont. 1896), nor is it necessarily a defect
in the walk rendering it out of repair. Street v. Holyoke, io5 Mass. 82 (870).
There is therefore, no liability for damages caused by such a defect unless actual notice of the condition of the walk has been given. Stauke v. St. Paul,
71 Minn. 5r (i898), or such condition has continued so long that the corporation must be presumed to have had notice, Gaylord v. New Britain, 58 Conn.
398 (i89o), and it is reasonable under the circumstances to have expected
the corporation to have remedied the defect and there has been time and opportunity for so doing.
The overflow of the fountain can hardly be regarded a defect in the
sidewalk so pronounced as in Conklin v. Elmira, ii N. Y. App. 402 (1896),
where the roofs of a tree caused an uneveness in the sidewalk, giving an
opportunity for ice to form. Yet it would seem that some such patent defect or the continuous flow of the water, as in Scoville v. Salt Lake City, II
Utah 6o (1894), is necessary to fasten the liability.
In a Canadian case, Taylor v. Winnipeg, 12 Manit. R. 479 (i898), drippings from a public pump froze, creating a dangerous spot and in denying recovery the court said that the question was one of reasonableness. In another nearly analogous case, Corbett v. Troy, 53 Hun, 228 (i889) recovery
was allowed, but the leakage from the hydrant had continued throughout the
winter. Clearly there is no duty on the city to sand its streets. McGuinness
v. Worcester, i6o Mass. 272 (1894).
The case seems clearly in accord with the authorities but as it was
returned to the lower court on account of the insufficiency of the averment,
it is not very satisfactory for the enunciation of definite principles.
NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL

INJURIES-EASURE

OF

DAMAGES-PAIN

AND

SuFFERiNG.-In a recent appeal, assigning for error the following part of a
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charge, viz.: "as a result of the injury (received through defendant's negligence) you will allow the plaintiff compensation for the pain and suffering he
has undergone, * * * and also the present worth of pain, if any likely to
be suffered by him in the future," it was held, that the instructions were
erroneous. "The only thing the law aims at in such cases as this is compensation. An instruction that leaves the jury to regard pain and suffering
as an independent item of damage that can be compensated by a sum of
money that may be regarded as a pecuniary equivalent, is not only inexact,
but is erroneous." McLan e v. Pgh. Rwys. Co., 230 Pa. 29 (1911).
There is no fixed standard or legal measure of damages for the pain
and suffering resulting from a personal injury. Weber v. Rwy. Co., io7
N. Y. S. 965 (19o7). The jury should consider the nature of the injury and
the pain and inconvenience resulting therefrom, and make such compensation therefor as, in view of all the attending circumstances, will reasonably
compensate the plaintiff for the pain and suffering in the past, and which he
may suffer in the future. Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376 (Del. i9IO) ; Howard
v. Traction Co., 121 S. W. 954 (Ky. igo).

But the idea of a price as a

measure of plaintiff's damages, i. e., for what sum a person might be willing
to endure the injury, is incorrect. Musick v. Latrobe, 184 Pa. 375 (1898).
Under this item of damages is included not only physical pain and
suffering, but also mental pain endured, and likely to be suffered, which
has arisen directly from the physical injury. Rwy. Co. v. Anderson, 182 Ill.
2g98 (i8go) ; although the law will not compensate mental pain when it stands
alone, when accompanied by any injury to the person, it will be taken into
consideration in awarding damages. Bevan on Negligence (2nd Ed.) 77; and
it is immaterial how slight the personal injury is. Smith v. Holcomb, 99
Mass. 552 (r868).

Mental pain may include mental anguish, the sense of loss and burden,
the inconvenience and the embarrassment, arising directly from the injury.
Rice v. City of Council Bluffs, 124 Ia. 639 (i9o4) ; provided that it be caused
by plaintiff's realization of the effect of the injuries on himself, and not on
third parties. Traction Co. v. McKee, 27 Ohio Cir. 63o (Igo5). Mortification and anguish of mind which a person has suffered, and is likely to
suffer, by reason of the mutilation of his body and the fact that he may become an object of curiosity or ridicule, may also he considered in determining the amount of damages. Power v. Harlow, 57 Mich. 107 (r885);
Sechrist v. John, II Pa. Super. 59 (1899).
DELICT CONCURRING WITN ACT OF GOD, AS
NEGLIGENcE-DEFENDANT'S
PROXIMATE CAUSE.-In Frederick v. Hale, 112 Pac. 70 (Mont. i9IO), an in-

struction in effect, that if the injury to plaintiff's property was occasioned by
a combination of negligence on defendant's part and'an unprecedented flood
constituting an act of God, the plaintiff could still recover if defendant's
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, was held correct.
It is universally agreed that if the plaintiff's injury is caused by the concurring force of the defendant's negligence and some other cause for which
he is not responsible, including an act of God, the defendant is nevertheless
responsible if his negligence is one of the proximate causes of the damage.
Salisbury v. Herchenroder, io6 Mass. 458 (871); Wolf v. Express Co., 43
Mo. 421 (1869) ; Jackson . Telephone Co., 88 Wis. 243 (1894). The only
authority contra is dictum in Sharp v. Cincinnati, 26 Oh. Cir. Ct. Rep. 59
(1904). The rule is more frequently stated conversely: the concurrence
of negligence with the act of God in producing the injury is necessary to
fix liability. If the act is so overwhelming as of its own force to produce the

injury independently of the negligence shown, defendant cannot be made
responsible. Rodgers v. Co. 67 Cal. 6o7 (1885); Helhling v. Cemetery Co.,
2oi Pa. 171 (I9o2).

A serious difference of opinion has arisen in the application of this principle to cases where a carrier, by negligent delay, exposes goods to injury from
an act of God, or other cause, for which the carrier is not responsible, and
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which he could not naturally forsee. In Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 171
03852), the maxim causa proxima non remota spectatur was applied to
such a case, although the extraordinary flood would not have affected the
plaintiff's goods if the carrier had not negligently delayed their transportation. This case has been followed in several states. Denny v. R. R. Co., 79
Mass. 481 (1859); Daniels v. Ballantine, 23 Oh. St. 532 (1872), and it has
the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States, R. R. Co. v. Reeves,
io Wall, 176 (1869). But the weight of authority would seem to be against
these cases. Campbell v. Morse, Harp, 468 (S. C. 1824) ; Michaels v. R. R.
Co., 30 N. Y. 564 (1864) ; Wald v. R. R. Co., 162 Ill. 545 (896); see especially
Bibb v. Ry., 94 Minn. 269 (195o). These cases are treated as similar to the
act of a master of a vessel in deviating from the usual course of his voyage,
which is everywhere held a sufficiently proximate cause of damage from a
tempest, in itself the act of God, to entitle the shipper to recover. Davis v.
Garrett, 6 Bing. 716 (Eng. 183o); Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410 (1838);
Johnson v. R. R. Co., 33 N.. Y. 61o (1865). A reason given for the liability
of the carrier in these cases is that by the deviation the insurer is discharged, and since the defendant has caused this loss of protection to the
shipper, he should bear the loss. But it is submitted that the fixed rules as
to proximate and remote cause should not be thus lightly set aside. There
is nothing in the policy of the law relating to common carriers that calls for
any different rule, as to consequential damages, to be applied to them. They
should be answerable for the ordinary and proximate consequences of their
negligence, not for those that are remote and extraordinary. The ordinary
consequence of the fault charged in this line of cases is that of time, and
the penalty should be measured accordingly, even though a concurrence
of other extraordinary circumstances has greatly increased the extent of
the loss.
N,GOTIABLE
EFFECT OF N. I.

INSTRUMENTs-GENERAL

POWER

TO

CONFESS

JUDGMENT-

L.-Two cases recently decided in Pennsylvania present an interesting question of the interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
adopted in this State by the Act of May 16, 19Ol, P. L. 194. The section
under which the cases fall, Sec. 5, cl. 2, provides "the negotiable character
of an instrument otherwise negotiable is not affected by a provision which
* * * authorizes a confession of judgment if the instrument be not paid
at maturity."
In Volk v. Shoetiaker, 229 Pa. 407 (1911) the following sentence in the
opinion is significant: "No copy of the judgment bond was printed in the
record but it is apparent from what is shown that it authorized the entry
of judgment at any time and under the Act of i9oi, the effect of a provision authorizing a confession of judgment before maturity is to make the
instrument non-negotiable." In Yankolivitz v. Wernick, 20 Dist. Rep. 223
(I911), attached to the promissory note in suit was a power of attorney
authorizing the confession of judgment "as of any term." It was held that
this provision destroyed the negotiability of the note.
The leading case in which this question has been considered is that of
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846). In that case a power of attorney was
attached to a promissory note. Gibson C. J. held that "a negotiable instrument is a courier without luggage. It must be free from contingencies or
conditions that would embarass it in its course; for a memorandum to control it, though indorsed on it would be incorporated with it and destroy it."
The authority of Overton v. Tyler was questioned in Zimmerman v.
Anderson, 67 Pa. 421 (1871), but as the two cases were not analogous, the
court avoided expressing any direct views upon it. In Sweeney v. Thickstun,
77 Pa. 132 (1874), the same question as that presented in Overton v. Tyler was
again raised. The ruling of the court in Overton v. Tyler was substantiated and the fact that Zimmerman v. Anderson was no authority contrary
to the Overton. v. Tyler rule was carefully noted.
The text writers seem opposed to the rigor of this doctrine and maintain
that the negotiability of the note should not be destroyed. Parsons, Notes
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and Bills, Vol. II, p. 146; Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, Vol. I, Sec. 61,
5th Ed. Although there are few cases on the subject the majority of them
take the view contended for, Osborn v. Hawley, ig Ohio 13O (i85O). In
Osborn v. Hawley, although the note was held to be negotiable, the power
of attorney was held to lapse and this view was supported in Marsden v.
Soper, ii Ohio St. 503 (i86o). In Watson v. Paine, 25 Ohio St. 340 (874),
however, a power of attorney in favor of any holder was held to pass with
the note and this case in turn was supported in Clements v. Hull, 35 Ohio
St. 141 (I878), where, however, the power in operation was confined to any
time after the- maturity of the note. See in accord Gilmore v. Hirst, 56
Kan. 626 (1896); Mumford v. Tolman, 157 Ill.
258 (1895). (?)
Following the passage of the Act of May 16, i9oi, the Pennsylvania
court laid down an exception to it by saying that a general authority to confess judgment may be exercised before the maturity of the paper and therefore is not within the provision of the Act making the paper negotiable.
Neill v. Dawson, ii Dist. Rep. 633 (19o2); Hipple's use v. Stoner, 14 Dist.
Rep. 631 (I9o4). This view was adopted by the Superior Court in Milton
Bank v. Beaver, 25 Pa. Super. 494 (1904), where a note containing a power
of attorney to confess judgment "as of any term" was held to render the
paper non-negotiable.
The only other case decided since the passage of the Act substantiates
the view taken by the Pennsylvania courts that a general power of attorney
to confess judgment, the power not limited to take effect only upon maturity, destroys negotiability. Wisconsin Yearly Meeting v. Babler, 115
Wis. 289 (1902).
PLEDGES-FLD STORAGE WAREHOUSING.-A
corporation leased all its
premises to a warehousing company which appointed an employee of the
corporation its custodian upon the leased premises and gave him power to
issue warehouse receipts for all goods upon the premises. Neither the premises nor the goods therein were marked in any way to indicate the possession
of the warehousing company. The receipts issued to the corporation owning
the goods and the premises on which they were stored were used by its officers as collateral for loans. In one instance a bank received such a receipt
as collateral, had certain goods set apart, marked as pledged, and placed in
charge of an agent. Held, that in the latter case the pledge was valid,
but the lien of other creditors, who merely held the warehouse receipts,
failed for want of delivery to and possession by the warehousing company
of the goods attempted to be pledged. American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving
Co., 183 Fed. 96 (igio).
It is essential to a valid pledge that the pledgee obtain and keep possession of the pledged property. He may do this by placing the goods in
charge of his own agent upon the premises of the pledgor, if the removal
of the goods is not convenient. Sumner v. Hamlet, 12 Pick. 76 (Mass.
183i) ; Dunn v. Train, 125 Fed. 221 (1903). In order to relieve creditors of
the inconvenience and liability incident to the possession of property pledged
to them for their advances, the system of "field storage warehousing" has
been developed. A warehouseman stores the goods of the debtor upon
premises of the debtor leased to him for the purpose and issues warehouse
receipts for the goods which receipts are delivered to creditors as collateral,
who thereby acquire a valid lien upon the goods of which they have constructive possession.
For the protection of unsecured creditors the courts have placed limitations upon the system. The warehouseman issuing the receipts must have
actual possession of the property, and due and reasonable care must be
observed by him to negative the existence of ostensible ownership in the
pledgor, and to put third persons upon inquiry. Philadelphia Warehousing
Co. v. Winchester, 156 Fed. 6oo (i9o7). So where goods marked with
the name of the storage company were placed upon leased premises, placarded with the name of the company, in charge of an appointed custodian,
the pledge of the goods was valid. Love v. Export Storage Co., r43 Fed. i
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(19o6). But the mere placing of inconspicuous tags upon goods stored in
a building of the owner, did not give a creditor who held warehouse receipt
for such goods a valid lien.

In re Rodgers, 125 Fed. 169 (19o3).

The ware-

houseman need not lease the premises upon which he stores the goods. A
permitted occupation, exclusive of the owner, is sufficient. American Pig
Iron, etc., Co. v. German, 126 Ala. 194 (i899). The goods warehoused may
be continually changed and replaced by the owner with the consent of the
pledgee without affecting the validity of the pledge. Fidelity, etc., Ins. Co. v.
Roanoke Iron Co., 81 Fed. 439 (1896). The goods may remain at the owner's
risk and hazard. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U. S. 530 (195o). The
principal case illustrates correctly the distinctive features between a valid
and invalid pledge of property warehoused by the field storage system.
PRACTicE--FEDERAL

JURISDIcrioN-LmL.-In United States Press Pub-

lishing Co., 31 Sup. Ct. 212 (I9II), an indictment for libel was brought
under the Act of July 7, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 717 Sec. 2, Chap. 576, U. S.

Comp. Stat., 1901, p. 3652) which provides that "when any offence is committed in any place, jurisdiction over which has been retained by the
United States or ceded to it by a State or which has been purchased with
the consent of a State for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building or structure, the punishment of which offence
is not provided for by any law of the United States, the person committing
such offence shall, upon conviction in a Circuit or District Court of the
United States for the district in which the offence was committed be liable to
and receive the same punishment as the laws of the State in which such
place is situated now provide for the like offence when committed within
the jurisdiction of such State and the said courts are hereby vested with
jurisdiction for such purpose."
The alleged libels were published in the New York World, which was
printed in New York City. They were directed at the President, the Secretray of War and private individuals. The newspapers were circulated on the
West Point reservation and a copy was delivered to a post-office inspector
in the post-office building. The New York Penal Code, Sect. 25I, provides:
"A person cannot be indicted or tried for the publication of the same libel
against the same person in more than one county."
In an exhaustive opinion by Chief Justice White, it was held: "Congress,
in adopting it (the statute) seduously considered the two-fold character
of our constitutional government and had in view the enlightened purpose,
so far as the punishment of crime was concerned, to interfere as little as
might be with the authority of the States on that subject over all territory
situated within their exterior boundaries and which hence would be subject
to exclusive State jurisdiction but for the existence of a United States reservation.

The statute *

*

* adopted and wrote in the State law *

*

*

that the offence, although punished as an offence against the United States
was punishable only in the way and to the extent that it would have been
punishabre if the territory embraced by the reservation remained subject to
the jurisdiction of the State. Two propositions are plainly established. First,
that adequate means were afforded for punishing the circulation of the libel
on a United States reservation by the State law and in the State courts,
without necessity of resorting to the courts of the United States for redress;
Second, that resort could not be had to the courts of the United States to
punish the act of publishing a newspaper libel by circulating a copy of the
newspaper on the reservation, upon the theory that such publication was an
independent offense, separate and distinct from the primary printing and
publishing of the libelous article within the State of New York, without
disregarding the laws of that State and frustrating the plain purpose of such
law, which was that there should be but a single prosecution and conviction."
The United States has no law governing a libel such as that alleged, for
the United States has no common law, U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384 (0798),
and there is no statute covering it. If we accept the converse of the propo-
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sition laid down in U. S. v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875 (x888), that it must be
affirmatively established that the offense was committed at or within a place
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the accuracy of the
decision is indisputable.
The only case at all similar to the leading case is U. S. v. Smith, 173
Fed. 227 (i909), in which the defendants printed a newspaper containing
the alleged libels in Indiana and sent by mail copies to Washington to subscribers and others. It was held that the libel was published in Indiana only.
See 58 Univ. of Pa. L. R. 318.
The.decision will no doubt afford satisfaction to the champions of States
Rights. It recommends itself as a logical and accurate interpretation of
the statute.
PRACTICE-JURYMEN LEAVING Box-UNswoRN BAILIFF ATTENDING HIM.During a trial of murder a juror became indisposed and was obliged to leave
the court for a considerable time. He was attended by an unsworn bailiff and
three doctors. On appeal against the conviction, it was argued that although there was no suggestion that the juror had been improperly approached yet the jury ought to have been re-sworn, or a new juror added, and
the trial recommenced. Held, not a mistrial. Rex v. Crippen, io3 L. T.
705 (191).
,
In Delamere's Case, ii How St. Trials 56o (i686) the Judges of England
gave their opinion that the jury once sworn may not separate till they have
given their verdict. Less stringent rules were soon adopted in cases of misdemeanor. Rex v. Kinnear, 2 Barn. & Ald. 462 (i819). In trials of felonies
the early rule was strictly adhered to. Rex v. Canning, xg How. St. Trials 671
(i754). But in Reg. v. O'Neill, 3 Cr. & Dix. 146 (843), in a larceny case
a juror was absent from court for more ban an hour without a bailiff, yet a
new trial was denied, it not being shown the prisoner was prejudiced by the
separation.
In America the general rule is that when jurors leave the court they
should be placed in custody of an officer duly sworn to attend them. Farley
v. People, 138 Ill. 97 (1891). Where there has been an improper separation
the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that the irregularity
has been prejudicial to him, Gamble v. St., 44 Fla. 429 (i9o2) ; Carter v. St.
78 Miss. 348 (igoo) ; contra, Waller v. People, 209 Ill. 284 (1904). Hampton
v. St. II Wis. 127 (Igoi) held, this presumption cannot be satisfactorily
overcome by affidavits of the jurors that they were not prejudicially affected
by the separation; contra, Commonwealth v. Williams, 209 Pa. 529 (1904).
As to the necessity for administering a special oath to the officer at the time
a juror is placed in his charge, and the effect of a failure to do so, the decisions are not in accord. In some states the rule that the officer must be
specially sworn is strictly enforced, and an omission to administer such oath
is held to be good ground for a new trial. Lewis v. People, 44 Ill. 45:2
(1867); St. v. McCormick, 57 Kan. 44o (1896) ; Brucker v. St., i6 Wis. 333
(1863). But the modern tendency seems to be to relax the strictness of this
rule, and not to set aside a verdict on account of the failure to swear an officer
where it appears that no prejudice has resulted therefrom. People v."'ohnson, 46 Hun, 667 (N. Y. 1887); Baker v. St., 4 Tex. App. 223 (1878); and
if the officer has taken the general oath during the term, it is held sufficient.
St. v. Crafton, 84 Iowa, io9 (1893) ; St. v. Frier, ii8 Mo. 648 (1893). Decisions in accord with the principal case were reached in St. v. Schmidt, 137
Mo. 266 (1897), and St. v. Burns, ig Wash. 52 (1898), on similar facts.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SPECIAL PROMISE

To

ANSWER FOR THE DEbT OF AN-

oTHER.-In Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman 69 S. E. 898 W. Va. (igio)
the defendant made a verbal promise to pay for goods sold and delivered
to a coal and coke company of which he was president, treasurer and a large
stockholder. The coal company became insolvent, and the plaintiff having
recovered a portion of the debt due in bankruptcy proceedings, brought an
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action for the remainder. Held, the benefit accruing to the promisor from the
sale and delivery being remote and indirect, the promise was collateral, and
not being in writing was void under the Statute of Frauds.
It is frequently said that where the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer for the debt of another, but to subserve some pecuniary
or business purpose of his own, the promise is not -within the statute and
need not be in writing. Browne, Statute of Frauds, Sec. 212; Emerson v.
Slater, 22 How 28 (1859); Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479 (891) ; Scott v.
White, 71 Ill. 287 (1874); Weisel v. Spence, 59 Wis. 3oi (1884); Patton v.
Mills, 21 Kan. 163 (878); Crawford v. King, 54 Ind. 6 (876).
But this general rule was undoubtedly deduced from cases where property
was placed in the hands of the promisor, as a fund out of which the promisee
was to be paid. Williams v. Leper 3 Burr, i886 (I766); Edward v. Kelley,
6 Maule & S. 2o8 (I817). The promise was a promise to account and not
the special promise or assumpsit contemplated by the statute. The courts,
however, have gradually come to speak of this as a "new and beneficial
consideration moving toward the promisor," and "enuring to his benefit,"
and so sufficient consideration to take his promise without the statute. They
have not kept the fundamental distinction clearly in mind between cases where
the promise was to account, with a transfer of property, and a special promise
or special assumpsit with sufficient consideration to support a simple contract.
As a consequence much confusion has arisen under this section of the
statute, and while a majority of cases decided under the theory that "the
leading purpose and object of the promisor must be to promote some interest
of his own" are cases where property has been transferred and so analogous
to Williams v. Leper (supra) ; It re Dresser, 135 Fed. 495 (i95) ; Linam v.
Jones, 134 Ala. 570 (i9i); Doe v. Allen, 82 Pac. 568 (905); Kinsley v.
Brown, 95 Ill. App. 516 (Igo0); Am. Lead Pencil Co. v. Wolfe, 3o Fla. 361
(1892); Vaughan v. Smith, 65 Ia. 579 (1885); no recovery, no property
transferred; Stewart v. Jerome, 71 Mich. 201 (1888); Nelson v. Boynton, 3
Metc. (Mass. 184), 396, still the generality of expressions used is such that
the rule has been extended to cases which do not bear the least resemblance to those on which the rule is based. Meyers v. Morse, i5 Johns. (N. Y.)
425 (1818) ; Winn v. Hilyer, 43 Mo. App. 139 (i89) ; Dibble v. De Mattos,
8 Wash. 542 (i894).
In Pennsylvania this "new and beneficial consideration' is not required;
but the leading purpose and object of the promisor must be to subserve some
interest of his own. Nugent v. Wolfe, iii Pa. 471 (1886) ; Bailey v. Marshall,
174 Pa. 6o2 (i896); Crawford v. Pyle, igo Pa. 263 (i899). Under such a
doctrine the jury might easily have found the promise in the principle case,
without the statute.
According to the generally accepted theory, however, the court was right,
for mere interest as a stockholder of the corporation receiving the benefit of
the contract, has been held not sufficient "new and beneficial consideration"
to take the promise without the statute. Bank v. Stettheimer, IOI N. Y.
S. 513 (igo6); Turner v. Lyles, 68 S. C. 392 (igo3); Andover v. Flint, 54
Mass. 539 (1847). It is submitted that the reason for these decisions is that
no property was transferred to the promisor out of which he must account to
the promisee, but the action is on a special promise which has caused the
plaintiff to act to his detriment, and which under the Statute of Frauds must
be proved by a writing.
ToRTs-BLAcKLIsTING.-In the case of Jones v. Leslie, 112 Pac. Rep. 81
Wash. (igio), the plaintiff, a teamster, was about to leave the employ of the
defendant to take a better position with another employer. The defendant
threatened to withdraw his custom from the prospective employer if he employed the plaintiff, and thus succeeded in preventing the employment, to the
plaintiff's damage. There was a fourth party in the case, thus giving it the
The opinion
elements of a secondary boycott. The plaintiff recovered.
contains an interesting discussion of the question of whether or not "the
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right of employment in a laboring man is property." The court comes to the
correct conclusion that it is, by an argument based rather on fundamental
principles than on decided cases. Having affirmed the proposition that
business is property, the Court says: "To deny the same relief to the employed under similar circumstances would be a reproach to the law." -It is
interesting to compare the case of Atkins v. Fletcher, 55 Atl. Rep. 1074 (N. J.
19o3), in which it was held that the right to do business is not property
unless capital is invested in it and it is carried on for gain. The case, however, is now considered bad law.
The case is also interesting as one which applies the well-known rule of
Walker v. Cronin,IO7 Mass. 555 (1871), to a case where the defendant is of
the general class called capital, and fails to find justification for his acts. It
is submitted that the economic aspect of these cases has at times led the
courts to see justification for acts of employers, which would have been
"malicious" if done by employees. Thus economic self-advancement will not
justify such acts when done by labor. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (9oo).
while similar acts of capital are justifiable on the ground of competition;
Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, A. C. [1892] 25. The facts in the principal
case, however, disclose in addition to economic self-advancement, the presence of malice in fact, as a moving cause of the defendant's action.
TORTS-LIABILITY

OF OWNER

OF REAL

ESTATE To

LICENSE-DANGEROUS

ANImAI,-FINDINGS OF FAcT.-Where the occupier of land knows that people

are in the habit of going over his land and has acquiesced in their doing so,
though he has not given them express permission, he is not entitled to
put an animal which he knows to be savage on such land without any notice
or precaution; and he is liable for any injury caused by such animal to a
person crossing the land. Lowrey v. Walker, 1O3 Law Times 674 (House of
Lords, igoo).
This decision reverses a judgment of the Court of Appeal, reported ioI
Law Times 873; [igio] L. R. i K. B. 173; which affirmed a decision of the
Divisional Court, [igog] L R. 2 K. B. 433; ioi Law Times 78; which
reversed a decision of the County Court Judge. See 58 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 510 (May 1910); 58 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 11o (November i99).

In the judgment of the lower courts which the House of Lords reversed,
the plaintiff was treated as 4 mere trespasser on the defendant's land, and
a very nice question of the law of torts was involved. But it seems that
after delivering his judgment in the case, the judge of the county court, in
writing, explained that he did not use "trespasser" in its technical legal
significance; that the defendant's field had been habitually used by the public
with the defendant's knowledge and without his prohibition; and that the
plaintiff was one of the class thus accustomed to use the defendant's land.
The House of Lords merely decided that the County Court Judge had a
right to explain what he meant by his use of the word "trespasser." In the
light of the explanation given above, the plaintiff was really a licensee in the
eyes of the law, and the decision of the Lords reiterates a familiar principle
of tort law.
TRUSTS-CREATION INTER VIvoS-TRANSFER OF STocK.-In Talbot v. Talbot, 78 Atl. 535 (R. I. 1911), a voluntary trust was created under the following circumstances. One Frederick Talbot desired to create a trust in favor of
his wife by which she should be provided for after his death. He therefore executed and handed to his daughter, who was to be a trustee, a trust
deed of assignment which she immediately returned to him. He thereupon
separated the certificates of seventy-five shares of stock from the other securities and deposited them along with the deed of assignment in his daughter's safe deposit box. His three sons were appointed co-trustees with the
daughter, but they were never notified and did not know of the trust until
their fatheK's death. The trust deed recited that the income from the shares
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was to be paid to the donor during his life and upon his death to his wife.
There was also a special power of attorney to transfer the stock as required
by the company, but this was never done, and during his life the dividends
were always paid by the company to the donor. It was held that a valid
trust inter vivos was created.
The case shows the relaxation of the rules regulating the creating of
a trust inter vivos. Since the time of ex parte Pye and Dubost, iS Vesey
14o (I811), when it was declared that no consideration was necessary to raise
an express trust, the courts have steadily lessened the acts necessary to create
a trust and looked more closely into the real intent of the declarant.
It was clear from the evidence in Talbot v. Talbot that the intention was
to create a trust in praesenti. Having determined this, the question remained
whether' the declarant's acts were sufficient to transfer the ownership of the
shares. In other words if nothing remained to be done by him to complete
the transfer of title, the court could hold the trust relation established regardless of the fact that the whole transaction was voluntary. Stone v.
Hacket, 12 Gray (Mass.) 227 (1858).
The first respect in which the sufficiency of the acts might be doubted
is that no transfer was ever made on the books of the company. The legal
title, therefore, remained in the declarant, as was shown by his receiving the
dividends directly after the assignment. For the proposition that this transfer is essential to the creation of a valid trust, Milroy v. Lord, 4 De G. F.
& J. 264 (1862), was cited. This case has not been generally followed in this
country, except in a few of the earlier cases. Paine v. Paine, 28 R. I. 309.
In Maryland the principle of Milroy v. Lord, supra, is applied to its fullest
extent. In that state a transfer on the books of the company is essential to
the creation of a valid trust. Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208 (183o);
Baltimore Co. v. Mali, 65 Md. 93 (885).
The most important question in the present case was whether the delivery of the certificates, i. e., the evidence of title to a chose in action,
Slaymaker v. Bank, io Pa. 373 (1848), by a written assignment but without
endorsement constituted a Valid gift. In England the courts have so far
relaxed the rule as to hold that stocks and securities pass by delivery of the
paper by which the debt is evidenced, either with or without assignment or endorsement as a good gift mortis causa. Redfield, Wills, Vol. 2, p. 313.
There seems to be no distinction on this point between gifts mortis causa
and gifts inter vivos. Ames, Cases on Trust, 155 n. I. Such is apparently the
law in this country on the principle that the delivery of the certificates makes
the donee substantially dominus of the shares since he needs no further
assistance from the donor and can compel registration by the corporation.
Such delivery is all that is required to pass an equitable title to the donee
and in enforcing such title equity is not aiding a volunteer to perfect an
imperfect title, but is enforcing that title which the donor, by his delivery,
has already perfected. A full list of authorities for this proposition will be
found in the case under discussion, p. 545. The early English law seems
to have been opposed to this though the position taken is supported by the
overwhelming weight of American authority. Schouler, Pers. Prop §496;
Redfield, Railways, §35. The principal case there seems well within the
law on both these points and merely serves to point out the relaxation from
technical rules.

